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Inducing Adaptation in Human Organizations:  Concept and Experiment Design  
 
Abstract 
Mission performance is likely to be high when organizational structures are “congruent” 
with the mission and degraded when organizational structures are “incongruent” with the 
mission.  All else being equal, it is to an organization’s advantage to monitor the fit 
between its structure and mission, and to alter its structure when a misfit is identified.  
We afforded teams the opportunity to adapt their organizational structure to changes in 
the mission.  In the forced case, teams had to allocate new assets to deal with a SCUD 
threat entering theater.  In another situation, the team could adapt their organizational 
structure to a mission that had grown incongruent with that structure.  Our primary 
interest was this adaptation process.  Results indicate that the teams did adapt; frequently, 
they made many small changes to adjust workload and to compensate for weak team 
members.  Less frequently, they made major changes in response to changing mission 
and task requirements.  Teams appeared reluctant to make the larger changes necessary to 
realign organizational structure and mission.  This reluctance stems in part from their 
concern with the cost of change and in part from a difficultly in understanding 
organizational structures and the ramifications of changes made to the structures.  




Mission performance is likely to be high when command and control (C2) organizational 
structures are “congruent” (aligned with) with the mission tasks to be performed 
(Diedrich et al., 2003).  In contrast, if C2 structures are “incongruent” (misaligned with) 
the mission tasks, mission performance will likely be degraded.  All else being equal, it is 
to an organization’s advantage to monitor the fit between its structure and mission, and to 
alter its structure when a misfit is identified.   
 
There is empirical evidence that high performing organizations can discern when 
environmental forces have changed the state of congruence (i.e., the goodness of fit), thus 
driving changes in the strategies (e.g., communication patterns, back-up behaviors) that 
they employ (Entin & Serfaty, 1999).  Rarely, however, do organizations make changes 
to their organizational structures (i.e., asset allocation, team member roles and 
responsibilities) in order to facilitate congruence (Hollenbeck et al., 1999).  There may be 
several reasons for this reluctance.  First, organizations may not feel that they have been 
empowered to make alterations to their organizational structures.  Second, even if an 
organization has the flexibility to change their structure, they may lack the necessary 
training to do so competently.  Third, organizations may sense that structure and mission 
are becoming incongruent, but they may have difficulty gauging the nature or severity of 
the mismatch.  Lastly, organizations may feel uncomfortable switching from known 
structures to those that are less well known and unproven.  Given these obstacles to 
change, organizations may remain in inefficient structures, neglecting opportunities for 
improved performance.  Given the potential benefits of dynamic structural adaptation, it 
is essential to understand how an organization can be persuaded to adapt.  If adaptation is 
incentivized and obstacles minimized, to what degree and for what reasons will 
organizations change their structures?  The primary purpose of the exploratory study 





The work reported here builds on previous efforts that studied the behavior of 
organizations operating under conditions of incongruence.  For instance, Entin et al. 
(2003) sought to identify the conditions that might be salient enough to cause 
organizations to alter not only their strategies, but also their structures.  This work 
employed model-based organizational design techniques to create mission scenarios that 
were either congruent or incongruent with two organizational structures (Kleinman et al., 
2003).  The two organization structures were “Divisional” and “Functional.”  In the 
Divisional organization, each participant controlled a multifunctional platform that was 
able to process a variety of tasks (e.g., air, surface, strike, etc.) in a limited geographical 
area.  In the Functional organization, each participant specialized in one aspect of the 
mission (e.g., strike), using assets that were distributed across multiple platforms over the 
entire battle space.  Two mission scenarios were designed by manipulating between-
player coordination requirements such that one mission provided a good fit to the 
Divisional organization but was misfit to the Functional structure; the other mission 
scenario provided a good fit to the Functional structure but not to the Divisional structure.  
Results showed that performance was significantly worse in the incongruent conditions 
as compared to the congruent conditions.  Additionally, self-reported workload was 
higher in the incongruent conditions as was overall communication rate.  Importantly, 
these data pointed toward a set of indicators that have the potential to yield diagnostic 
information regarding congruence early in a mission scenario.  These include 
performance measures (composite variables such as mission tasks processed, latency, and 
accuracy), team coordination processes (e.g., communication patterns), and workload 
levels (e.g., subjective assessments).    
 
In this study, structural adaptation was investigated using the scenarios and structures 
employed by Diedrich et al. (2003).  Six member teams were trained in both the 
divisional and functional structures.  Following an initial training period, the teams 
participated in two congruent mission scenarios followed by an incongruent mission 
scenario.  After each mission, participants were given detailed information about the 
characteristics of the next mission, as well as real-time, diagnostic indicators of 
performance and congruence.  They were then given the opportunity to plan and adapt 
their structures during a facilitated planning session.  All changes proposed by team 
members were accompanied by justifications.  Thus, this process allowed the observation 
of the structural “morphing” process. 
 
For the purposes of this study, team performance was of secondary concern.  Of primary 
interest was the adaptation process itself.  The goals for the effort reported here were to: 
 
• Evaluate the ability to induce and support structural adaptation through novel 
methodology 
• Capture and categorize the attempts towards structural adaptation made by teams 
• Evaluate the efficacy of proposed changes in relation to optimal organizational 
designs 
• Identify the obstacles for adaptation 
 
Our approach was to facilitate structural change by providing training on why adaptation 




successful adaptation, and by presenting feedback about past performance and expert 
appraisal of likely future performance with and without changes. It was hoped that these 






Thirty officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA served as 
participants.  Most of the officers were 03 or 04; several services and nations were 
represented.  Participants were organized into five teams of six individuals each.  




The Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD) environment was used to simulate 
several mission scenarios for use in this study.  The DDD is a distributed client/server 
simulator that allows extensive mission customization in order to investigate individual 
and team performance in an operationally rich, experimentally valid environment.  In 
general, DDD simulations involve individual and team decision-making about complex 
situations based on information and resources provided by both the simulation and other 
team members (Serfaty & Kleinman, 1985; Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989).  The simulation 
enables the manipulation of variables such as organizational structure and mission 
scenario tasking.  A variety of performance measures can be recorded within the DDD 




Each team was initially assigned to one of two organizational structures characterized by 
the types of assets within each team member’s control.  In the Divisional organizational 
structure, each team member had responsibility of functionally diverse assets in a single, 
defined geographic area; they were given control of all assets within that area.  In 
contrast, participants in teams assigned to the Functional organizational structure were 
given control of functionally similar assets dispersed throughout the mission battle space; 
for example, they might be given all ISR or Strike capabilities.  In this investigation, 
participants were assigned randomly to three Divisional teams and two Functional teams.   
 
Participants were briefed as to the general purpose of the study before signing an 
informed consent form.  Training began with two hours of DDD “buttonology” in which 
participants were taught control of the DDD user interface, the capabilities of the assets 
and platforms available within the DDD environment, and basic strategies for 
accomplishing common tasks.  This was followed by a second two-hour training session 
in which participants completed short mission scenarios. This session exposed 
participants to the general mission expectations, which included following a mission task 
plan, reacting to unexpected time critical events, balancing defensive and offensive roles, 
and coordinating with other team members for task completion.  The training scenarios 
were designed to instruct without imposing bias for any particular organizational 




both Divisional and Functional structures.  Following the second training session, each 
team participated in two data-collection sessions.  Each data-collection session consisted 
of one or more DDD simulations and one or more planning sessions.  Training and data 
sessions varied from 2 to 3 hours, and took place over several days. 
 
For the data-collection sessions, scenarios were developed that were either well suited to 
the Divisional organizational structure (divisional scenario) or to the Functional 
organizational structure (functional scenario; Diedrich et al. 2003).  A mission was 
considered to be congruent if the team’s organizational structure (Divisional or 
Functional) was matched with its associated scenario (i.e., a Divisional team in a 
divisional scenario or a Functional team in a functional scenario).  In contrast, a session in 
which the team and scenario structures are mismatched was considered incongruent 
(Divisional with functional, Functional with divisional).  Congruence was achieved by 
defining task requirements within a scenario that matched the asset capabilities of an 
organizational structure, thus reducing need for coordination between players and 
minimizing overhead.   
 
Each mission scenario was presented in operational terms that were familiar to the 
participants.  They involved a Joint Forces mission in which teams were required to use a 
variety of sea, land, and air assets to destroy or capture an enemy command center, two 
naval bases, two air bases, and a seaport.  Concurrently, the teams had offensive and 
defensive responsibilities that were time critical and distracted them from the main 
mission objectives (e.g., destroy Exocet missiles and coastal defense launchers, perform 
search and rescue operations, engage targets of opportunity, etc.).  For additional 
complexity, the area of operations also contained neutral parties and peripherally hostile 
assets which were either to be ignored or to be of low priority.  Missions lasted 
approximately 35 minutes or until the final mission task was completed, whichever came 
first.   
 
In the initial data-collection session, all teams participated in a scenario congruent with 
their organizational structure.  Upon completion of the scenario, they were told that the 
enemy was introducing SCUD ballistic missiles into theater.  Each team was given two 
additional weapon systems, anti-ballistic missiles and loiterable cruise missiles to 
counteract the SCUD threat.  They then participated in a 45 minute facilitated planning 
session (PS1) to decide how to best allocate these new assets, and whether to re-allocate 
existing assets.  Any change had to be justified by attributing it to a cause, such as 
improving situational awareness, reducing the need for coordination, or compensating for 
team player capabilities.  They then ran in a second data-collection scenario with these 
changes.  The second scenario was congruent to their initial organization, and differed 
from the first scenario solely by the addition of the expected SCUD missiles.  The 
purpose of this change was to force the team to modify their structure to accommodate the 
additional resources, thus familiarizing them to the costs, benefits, and procedures 
involved with organizational change. 
 
In the third data-collection session, all teams participated in scenarios which were 
incongruent with their initial organization.  Teams were instructed that their adversary 
would be changing their defenses to impede the team’s mission progress.  However, the 




structure) in anticipation of the changes in mission requirements.  During a second 45 
minute facilitated planning session (PS2), they were able to make changes to their 
organizational structure by reallocating existing resources, reallocating tasks, and altering 
the roles of the individual team members. To encourage structural change, teams were 
presented with feedback on their performance in the congruent condition, in addition to a 
description of the performance of other teams in the incongruent condition they were 
about to attempt.  This feedback served as an appraisal of their likely performance if they 
did or did not change; performance that would be low compared to their performance in 
the previous, congruent missions. 
 
After completing the incongruent scenario with the changes they had indicated, they were 
again given feedback on their performance.  They were given another opportunity to 
make changes to their organizational structure in a third and final 45 minute facilitated 
planning session (PS3), in reaction to their mission performance and the enemy’s 
changes.  Teams did not have an opportunity to participate in the incongruent mission 
with these final changes.   
 
Figure 1 summarizes the optimal organization of teams for each data-collection session in 
this study.  Each team participated in three data-collection sessions (Initial, SCUDS/PS1, 
and PS2), and planned for a third (PS3).  For all teams, the Initial and SCUDS (PS1) 
sessions were congruent with their initial organizations, while the two remaining sessions 
(PS2, PS3) were incongruent.  A team displays adaptation if they remain in their initial 
organization during the SCUDS/PS1 session, and reallocate assets to the alternative 
organization in the remaining data-collection sessions (PS2, PS3). 
 
Initial SCUDS/PS1 PS2 PS3
Divisional (Teams A, C, E) Divisional Divisional Functional Functional









The DDD is capable of capturing many aspects of mission performance, including 
accuracy, task completion latency, and mission success.  Similarly, mission performance 
can also be quantified by evaluating subjective workload, communication patterns, and 
other factors. However, because the focus of this discussion is on structural adaptation to 
change, these measures will not be discussed in this paper.  To assess the adaptation 
process, the records of changes made by each team in the course of each planning session 
were analyzed.  From this, we calculated the percentage of assets in an optimal 
organization (primary measure of adaptation).   
 
During each of the three planning sessions, teams were given the opportunity to modify 
their existing organizational structures. The initial organization to which a team was 
assigned was optimized for missions of that type.  Thus, the allocation of assets in the 
Divisional organization was optimized for divisional missions and was ill-suited for 




was optimized for functional missions.  By calculating the similarity of asset allocation 
for each team after each planning session with the optimal Functional and Divisional 
organizations, the degree of overlap could be assessed.  This was accomplished by 
determining the percentage of assets in common.  Initially, each team was given 46 assets.  
After the inclusion of the weapon systems necessary to combat the introduction of SCUD 
missiles into theater the number of assets increased to 53.  As teams reallocated assets 
during each planning session, the percentage of the 53 assets that overlapped with the 




The allocation of assets for the teams initially assigned to the Divisional organization 
structure is presented in the three panels of Figure 2.  Figure 3 shows similar results for 
teams assigned to the Functional organization structure.  Note that in each figure the sum 
of each pair of bars will not equal 100%.  Any particular asset could be described as 
being in line with either an optimal Functional organization, an optimal Divisional 
organization, or neither.  In addition, there is a nominal (17%) number of assets that 
could be construed as being aligned with both the optimal Functional and optimal 
Divisional organizations.  Asset allocation that is not in line with these optimal 
organizations was not included in this analysis. 
 
Planning for the Introduction of SCUDs in Theater:  Planning Session 1 
Two of the three teams (Teams A & C) assigned the new assets in a manner that was 
consistent with a Divisional structure.  This is illustrated by the high overlap (> 90%) in 
asset allocation with the optimal Divisional organization.  Such an assignment of assets is 
adaptive because the following mission (SCUDS/PS1) was congruent with a Divisional 
organizational structure.  The third team assigned to the Divisional structure (Team E) 
took a different tact.  Specifically, they created a functional role for one of the team 
members by assigning that team member all of one weapon system.  As a consequence, 
only 52% of their assets overlapped with the optimal Divisional structure.  The actions of 
this latter team can be view as being maladaptive as the impending mission still matched 
a Divisional structure.   
 
The two teams assigned to the Functional structure (Teams B & D) allocated the new 
weapon systems to combat the SCUD threat in a manner consistent with a Functional 
organization.  As shown in Figure 3, at least 94% of assets overlapped with an optimal 
Functional structure.  In both cases, all of the assets of one weapon system were assigned 
to one team member and all the assets of the other weapon system were assigned to a 
second player.  Such assignments were adaptive as the subsequent mission (SCUDS/PS1) 
was still aligned with the Functional organizational structure.  In addition, both teams 
made another similar adjustment in that they reassigned the search and rescue assets from 
the initial team member to another team member.  This change was consistent with the 
Functional organization, and we surmise that it was done to off-load a team member that 
was perceived to be overloaded. 
 
Note that a majority of the adaptive changes made during the first planning session were 
forced.  Teams were required to allocate the assets of two new weapon systems to 




the opportunity to realign asset allocation to balance the workload better or compensate 
for a weak team member.  In contrast, what is reported next is the planning and asset 
reallocation to adapt to a mission that was incongruent with the team’s initial 
organizational structure based on between–player coordination requirements for task 
processing.    
 
Planning for Incongruence:  Planning Session 2 and 3 
 
Prior to planning session 2,  each team received a detailed briefing indicating that the 
enemy had made substantial changes.  The mission described to the Divisional teams was 
now congruent with a Functional organizational structure and the mission described to 
the Functional teams was now congruent with a Divisional organizational structure.  In 
effect, the mission described was incongruent with the team’s initial organization, and 
would require significant asset reallocation to the alternative organization to retain 
congruence.   
 
Two of the teams initially assigned to the Divisional structure (Teams A & E; Figure 2) 
made significant changes away from an incongruent Divisional structure and toward a 
congruent Functional structure.  Team A made adaptive changes in anticipation of the 
incongruent mission scenario, while the previous changes of Team E now proved 
adaptive.  Both teams created an ISR coordinator by assigning the UAV assets to the 
charge of one team member.  Moreover, Team A went further and allocated most of the 
fixed winged assets to one team member to create a de facto strike commander.  Neither 
team, however, became decidedly Functional, with at most 38% of assets inline with the 
optimal Functional structure.  Their new structure can be best described as hybrid: 
somewhere between a Divisional and Functional structure.  In planning session 3, which 
followed the teams’ experience with the incongruent mission both teams made only small 
adjustment to the allocation of assets.  Interestingly, in both case there was about a 6% 
shift in assets toward the (now) non-optimal Divisional structure. 
 
The third Divisional team (Team C) remained decidedly Divisional in structure as 81% of 
their assets were still assigned to this structure after planning session 2.  Experience with 
the incongruent mission had only a small impact.  The team’s allocation to the Functional 
structure increase by a little more than 10%, but three quarters of the assets were still 
allocated inline with a Divisional structure.  This team did not adapt, remaining strongly 
Divisional in the face of an incongruent Functional mission. 
 
Both teams initially assigned to the Functional organizational structure (Teams B & D) 
made little or no changes to their structure as a result of planning session 2 (Figure 3).  
Although the teams received a briefing prior to planning session 2 that the enemy had 
made several adjustments to its defensive and offensive posture that created a misfit 
between their current structure and the mission, these two teams decided to stay with 
their Functional structure.   
 
After participating in the incongruent mission one of the Functional teams (Team B) was 
willing to institute significant changes in the direction of a Divisional structure creating a 




reluctant to make changes and ended up making one or two alterations in asset allocation 





















































































































Figure 2.  Percentage of assets in an “optimal” organization as a result of each planning 















































































Figure 3.  Percentage of assets in an “optimal” organization as a result of each planning 









The major goal for this experimental effort was achieved. Teams made structural changes 
under appropriate conditions, although the changes made were modest in most cases.  A 
majority of the teams made adaptive changes to their asset allocation, either in 
anticipation or in response to incongruent enemy tactics.  Preliminary indications suggest 
that teams initially assigned to a Divisional organizational structure were more likely to 
make adaptive changes to their structure. 
 
The observation of the planning sessions provided many insights.  The two Functional 
teams in planning session 2 proved somewhat representative of most teams at this point:  
teams recognized that there was a mismatch between their organizational structure and 
the mission, but resisted making any changes.  An often heard argument against making 
any changes was the cost of changing.  Team members felt they were just getting to 
understand their roles and certainly did not want to encounter change.  This can be 
thought of as a primary aspect of inertia to change organizational structure (Hollenbeck et 
al, 1999).  However, it should also be pointed out that at this point in the protocol teams 
had not experienced the pain of performing in a misfit situation – that is, they had not 
actually played the scenario in the model-based misfit condition of Diedrich et al. (2003).  
 
In addition to adapting to changes in the mission, teams adapted to balance workload and 
compensate for a weak team member.  In some instances a team’s attempts to balance 
workload worsened coordination requirements because they split assets that were usually 
employed together over several team members.   
 
Despite our attempts to legitimize structural changes and provide feedback to help the 
teams gain insight into when structural change may be called for, the teams voiced 
reluctance to institute structural change.  They were concerned about the cost of change.  
Teams frequently considered and discussed several structural changes only to abandon 
them because they were worried about learning how to employ unfamiliar assets or how 
to undertake new mission tasks with little practice.  If we are to continue to press the 
virtues of structural change we will need to address this concern directly either through 
model driven aids showing the cost-benefit to change or enhanced training. 
 
In addition, the organizational structures employed in the simulation were simplified 
representations of real world C2 organizational structures.  Yet, even at this simple level 
the officers in the study had difficulty understanding the dynamics of the organizational 
structures used.  Moreover, they had even more difficulty visualizing what effects a 
particular structural change would have.  In the language of cognitive models, the officers 
did not have an adequate model of an organization in their heads and they could not run 
this model to visualize the effect of various changes.  Consequently, the adaptation 
process may be facilitated if intermediate organizations that are pre-existing and derived 
by higher authority to fit the mission are provided.  In other words, the process could be 
facilitated if the players had a “library” of organizations to choose from that could be 
matched to mission demands based on modeling and previously experience given mission 
types.  The important aspects of these intermediate organizations could be specifically 




provided for these organizational structures to allow the decision makers to conduct 
“what if” scenarios.  Alternatively, aspects of the intermediate organizations could be 
demonstrated by subject matter experts via video to give the decision makers insights into 
the different organizations and what they offer. 
 
Finally, the feedback we provided the officers to inform them that incongruence exists 
between the current structure and the mission was not well understood and not detailed 
enough to help them identify effective structural changes.  Critically, this was related to 
the observation that teams were often unaware as to how poorly they had performed a 
mission.  During training the orientation was to stay on mission and ultimately take the 
final objective, the enemy’s sea port before the scenario ended.  This led participants to 
believe that if they took the seaport or had gotten reasonably close to doing so they had 
performed well, but there was much more to high mission performance than just taking 
the seaport:  e.g., the level or accuracy with which each mission task was done, how well 
teams protected their assets and protected areas from enemy attack, how well teams 
prosecuted unexpected tasks that occurred throughout the scenario, and how well teams 
discriminated between enemy and neutral platforms.  Unfortunately, teams seemed to be 
relatively unaware as to how well they did on these latter issues.  These data suggest that 
feedback must be enhanced and made specific to various aspects of the mission.  In 
general, we must address this by providing more detailed feedback and by providing 
training on how to use this more detailed feedback to assess team mission performance. 
 
In total, this exploratory study advanced our knowledge a great deal concerning how 
teams approach making organizational changes.  Based on these data, we must now profit 
from our findings and develop more and/or better training and aids to assist this process if 
we wish to see it carried out effectively.  For instance, individuals and team can receive 
training on understanding the complexities of organizational structures, training to better 
diagnosis team performance, and aids that provide detailed feedback on team 
performance and the fit between structure and mission.  Ultimately, these are valuable for 
they reflect a starting point for training, decision aids, and other adaptation processes.  
Indeed, these data are compelling because they demonstrate that the teams would indeed 
adapt.  However, the extent of these adaptations was modest and not necessarily in a 
positive direction with respect to mission effectiveness.  Hence, our ongoing work will 
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Research Objectives
Develop & test theory of adaptive architectures
Investigate fit between organizational structures & 
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 Incongruence as a motivation to alter organizational structure 
Create conditions of incongruence & observe the 
adaptation process














Naval Postgraduate School Background – Experiment 8
Realization of Model-based 
Experimentation
 Model-based Organizations (F, D)
 Scenarios (f,d)
 Successful Manipulation of Congruence
 Congruent out-performed Incongruent
 Differences in communications 
& workload – leading indicators of 
incongruence
 New Model-Based Measures
 Several Papers
1 2 3 4 5 6
Platform STRIKE BMD ISR AWC SuWC/MINES SOF/SAR
1 CVN 2F18S xxx 1UAV 2F18A, E2C 1FAB, 1MH53 1HH60
2 DDGA 8TLAM 3ABM,4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP 1HH60,1SOF
3 DDGB 8TLAM 3ABM,4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP 1HH60,1SOF
4 CG 8TLAM 3ABM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB,2HARP,1MH53 1HH60
5 FFG* 2F18S xxx 1UAV 2F18A,E2C,4SM2 1FAB,2HARP,1MH53 1HH60

























Naval Postgraduate School Current Study – Goals
Follow directly from previous results
Observe and assess adaptation in response to incongruence
 Will an organization that is in an incongruent situation recognize
this fact, and adapt its structure (e.g., who owns what, who does 
what) in order to become more “congruent” with its environment?
Evaluate our ability to induce, guide, support and 
measure strategy and structural adaptation via:
Training, procedures, triggers, feedback, decision aids, … 
Effect adaptation during facilitated off-line planning
sessions, not during on-line dynamic play
Naval Postgraduate School Overcoming Resistance to Change
From previous work, we anticipated a reluctance of 
players to alter their organizational structure
Players must be educated to know that under certain circumstances 
it is not only permissible to alter organizational structure, but 
necessary to enhance mission effectiveness
Teams should be trained to be comfortable in making changes
Cross-training in the various assets available is essential
Provide exposure to “alternate” orgs (F—D) in training runs
Players will need feedback and aids to help them recognize the 
signs of incongruence and the need for change
Aids could be ppt slides, model outputs, data from run, etc.
Decision aids will be needed to help “negotiate” the changes
Test potential effectiveness of ideas prior to full implementation
Naval Postgraduate School Experimental Design (1)
H is a hybrid organization, “midway” between D and F
Exposes players to elements of Functional & Divisional structures
First “adaptation” (F ⇒ F1, etc.) to external SCUD threat
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Naval Postgraduate School Experimental Design (2)
Observational and self-reporting instruments were 
designed to collect data during planning sessions




















Naval Postgraduate School Planning Session Protocol
Planning/adaptation occurs prior to the 
next play
Questions posed to team by facilitator: 
 How are we doing?  
 Should we adapt in some way?  If yes, how?
Discussions were recorded for analysis
Asset changes recorded for immediate 
implementation
Strategic changes and rationale recorded
Naval Postgraduate School Congru-o-meter
Provided feedback before each planning session based 
on team performance to encourage adaptation
Model-Based Performance data was available within minutes.
Measures displayed were suggested by previous study 
as leading indicators and/or model based





Naval Postgraduate School Adaptation Analysis
To assess how adaptive changes made 
by the teams were, we: 
Broke asset allocation into the smallest 
meaningful elements  
Measure percent overlap between team asset 
allocation for each mission with the modeled 
organization
The result is: overall similarity between 
the team-generated allocations and the 
modeled class of organizations





























































































































































































































Team A adapted in 
anticipation of 
incongruence
Team C made few, 
minor changes.
Team E changed in 
a maladaptive 
fashion.
Blue: Percentage of Assets that are Functional
Red:  Percentage of Assets that are Divisional
Naval Postgraduate School Functional Results





































































































































































Team B made adaptive changes in 
reaction to incongruence.
Team D made few, minor changes.
Blue: Percentage of Assets that are Functional
Red:  Percentage of Assets that are Divisional
Naval Postgraduate School Conclusions
Demonstration of structural adaptation in some teams 
based on model-based congruence manipulation
Adaptations observed were modest and variable
 Most changes were small, some not adaptive
Participants often recognized the need for organizational change, 
but were reluctant to do so
Implementation of initial version of congru-o-meter
moderately successful
Model-based measures available for planning
What once took days now takes minutes!






Naval Postgraduate School Phasing in of SCUDS (PS #1)
An operationally meaningful external 
trigger
forced adaptation – teams must do something!
simply a stage- wise phase-in of a threat and 
assets to deal with it
Provides a bridge between training and 
data collection in the incongruent runs
Gives players familiarity and training with the 
facilitated adaptation process used in planning 
sessions
Naval Postgraduate School Hypothesized Adaptation Results
















































































































Blue: Percentage of Assets that are Functional
Red:  Percentage of Assets that are Divisional
